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Abstract
We present a model of judicial decision making in which the judge overweights the salient facts
of the case. The context of the judicial decision, which is comparative by nature, shapes which
aspects of the case stand out and draw the judge’s attention. By focusing judicial attention on such
salient aspects of the case, legally irrelevant information can affect judicial decisions. Our model
accounts for a range of recent experimental evidence bearing on the psychology of judicial decisions,
including anchoring effects in the setting of damages, decoy effects in choice of legal remedies, and
framing effects in the decision to litigate. The model also offers a new approach to positive analysis
of damage awards in torts.
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1 Introduction
According to legal formalism, judges deciding cases impartially verify facts and apply well-
defined law to these facts, with no room left for policy considerations, extra-legal norms, or
biases. After all, the theory goes, judges are selected and trained to perform such formal
analysis, they need to explain their opinions in writing, which disciplines thought, they are
constrained by the adversarial system from missing relevant facts or rules, and they are kept
on their toes by the risk of appellate review. In stark contrast to this perspective, legal
realism holds that both trial and appellate judges enjoy significant discretion in deciding
cases. Exercise of such discretion turns not just on the merits of the case but also on
personal factors such as judges’ political views, beliefs about the litigants, or the lawyers’
persuasive tactics.
One important strand of legal realism is “rule-skepticism”, which emphasises the discre-
tion exercised by appellate courts in applying law to an established set of facts (Posner 2008,
Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013). Another strand, called “fact-skepticism”, focuses on
the discretion that trial courts exercise in establishing facts (Radin 1925, Frank 1930, Frank
1949, Gennaioli and Shleifer 2008). Jerome Frank in particular stressed the importance of
psychology for fact-finding, claiming that judges and juries are often “mistaken”, “biased”
or “inattentive” (Frank 1949). The role of psychology in judicial decisions is again receiving
some attention, especially in experimental research (Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich 2001,
Kelman, Rottenstreich and Tversky 1996, Viscusi 1999, Rachlinski, Wistrich and Guthrie
2013). This research is based on the classic work of Kahneman and Tversky (Tversky and
Kahneman 1974, Kahneman and Tversky 1979), who identify a range of heuristics that de-
cision makers use to make judgments, and document biases that result from the use of such
intuitive heuristics. We recently proposed Salience Theory to unify the existing evidence on
heuristic decision making (Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer 2012, 2013, henceforth BGS). In
this paper, we revisit experimental evidence on judicial biases from the perspective of this
theory.
Salience Theory builds on the premise that the valuation of a choice option occurs not in
isolation, but in a comparative context. Decision makers contrast the features of the option
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in question to the features of choice alternatives or of “normal” situations that come to the
decision maker’s mind. For instance, the valuation of a premium good may fall if the good’s
high price (rather than its high quality) is salient, as when the good is presented together
with cheaper alternatives or when the decision maker is accustomed to buying the same good
at lower prices. The cognitive underpinning of Salience Theory is that human decisions are
mediated by perception and attention. In evaluating a range of options, attention is drawn
to unusual, extreme or salient attributes of each option. Because they draw attention,
salient attributes receive more weight in the decisions than is justified by normative theory.
Salience Theory accounts for well documented behavioral patterns such as the instability of
risk preferences (including preference reversals and Allais paradoxes), and more generally
provides a novel and psychologically based account of context effects (such as decoy effects).
By shaping what is perceived as normal and what is perceived as unusual or salient, context
influences attention and decisions.
This logic seems useful to examine judicial behavior. After all, most judicial decision
making is comparative. Judges compare the facts of the present case with facts of similar
cases, legal precedents, statutes, personal experiences or expectations in similar situations,
and so on. The fact that judicial decisions are made in context is partly by design; precedents
are indeed supposed to anchor judicial decisions. At the same time, Salience Theory suggests
that these anchors may focus judicial attention on peculiar aspects of the case which, though
salient, may not be the most useful or relevant for the legal decision.
In this paper, we first summarize Salience Theory, and then apply it to several experi-
ments bearing on the psychology of judicial decisions. In particular, we consider i) anchoring
mechanisms in the setting of damages, ii) decoy effects affecting the choice among different
legal remedies, and iii) framing of payoffs in shaping the choice of settlement versus litigation.
The key papers our analysis draws on include Rachlinksi (1996), Guthrie, Rachlinski and
Wistrich (2001), Kelman, Rottenstreich and Tversky (1996), and Viscusi (1999, 2001). We
show that Salience Theory provides a unified account of arguably disparate bits of evidence
on judicial decision making, but also offers a new approach to positive analysis of damage
awards in torts. In the concluding section, we consider some implications of Salience Theory
for such topics as legal evolution, legal procedure, and the stability of law.
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2 Salience Theory
2.1 A Simple Example
We first illustrate the logic of salience in the context of attitudes towards risk. Consider the
following experiments involving a choice between two risky prospects, or lotteries:
Experiment 1: Choose between the following two options:
L1 =
 $1 with prob. 0.95$381 0.05 , L2 =
{
$20 for sure. (1)
Experiment 2: Choose between the following two options:
L1 =
 $301 with prob. 0.95$681 0.05 , L2 =
{
$320 for sure. (2)
In both experiments, the risky option L1 offers a small (5%) probability of a high payoff,
and a high (95%) probability of a $19 loss relative to the sure outcome given by L2, but
the two lotteries have the same expected payoff. Experiment 2 simply adds $300 to all the
payoffs in Experiment 1.
A sample of 120 subjects participated in the two experiments (see BGS 2012b). In
Experiment 1, 83% of the subjects chose the safe option L2, while in Experiment 2, 67% of
the same subjects chose the risky lottery L1. Given that in each experiment the two options
offer the same expected value, the same subjects exhibit risk aversion in the first experiment
and are risk seeking in the second.
According to Expected Utility Theory, the stakes in either experiment are so low com-
pared to lifetime wealth that people ought to be roughly risk neutral, choosing the risky
lottery approximately 50% of the time. A small level of risk aversion would create stable
preferences for the safe lottery L2 in both experiments. Salience Theory, in contrast, predicts
the observed pattern of risk aversion in Experiment 1 and risk seeking behavior in Experi-
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ment 2.1 In Experiment 1, the risky lottery L1’s downside of $1 feels very low relative to the
sure payoff of $20. This bad outcome is salient and subjects overweight it in their decision,
leading to risk averse behavior. In Experiment 2, the risky lottery L1’s downside of $301
looks fairly similar to the sure payoff of $320. The prospect of winning $681 is more salient,
leading to risk seeking behavior.
As we show in BGS (2013), the same logic of comparative evaluation can be applied
to riskless choice. To give an example, imagine yourself in a wine store, choosing a red
wine. You consider a French syrah from the Rhone Valley, selling for $20 a bottle, and an
Australian shiraz selling for $10. You like French syrah better, you think it is perhaps 50%
better. Yet it sells for twice as much. You decide the Australian shiraz is a better bargain
and buy a bottle.
A few weeks later, you are at a restaurant, and you see the same two wines on the
wine list. Both of them are now marked up by $40, with the French syrah selling for $60 a
bottle, and the Australian shiraz for $50. You again think the French wine is 50% better,
but now it is only 20% percent more expensive. At the restaurant, it is a better deal. You
splurge and order the French wine. Salience Theory again predicts this reversal. At the
store, the price difference between the cheaper and the more expensive wine is more salient
than the quality difference, encouraging the consumer to opt for the cheaper option, whereas
at the restaurant, after the markups, the quality difference is more salient, encouraging the
consumer to splurge.
These examples illustrate how decision makers think in context when figuring out which
of several choices represents a better deal in light of the options available. We next describe
the salience model, formalising the intuition behind such thinking.
1Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) holds that people overweight the small 5% probability
of the high outcome, favoring risk loving behavior in both experiments. To obtain the reversal of risk
attitudes in Experiments 1 and 2, Prospect Theory requires a combination of probability weighting and
decreasing absolute risk aversion in the value function, provided that the decision maker’s reference point is
the status quo, zero gains or losses. If instead the reference point is the sure gain, the two choice problems
are identical and Prospect Theory cannot account for the evidence. A systematic comparison of Prospect
and Salience Theory is presented in BGS (2012).
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2.2 The Model
A decision maker evaluates N > 1 alternatives in a choice context C = {(a1k, a2k)}k=1,...,N ,
whose generic element is an option k identified by the value of its two attributes a1k and a2k.
Attributes are measured in dollars and known to the decision maker. The choice context
C contains the alternatives of choice but can in addition contain “normal” choice options
that are usually considered by the decision maker but are not currently available, or other
options that are explicitly brought to the decision maker’s attention.
This framework is sufficiently general to accommodate several applications. In choice
under risk, the choice context C consists of different risky prospects with up to two different
payoffs, in which case the attributes describe prospects’ payoffs (BSG 2012, and the framing
example of Section 3.3). In riskless choice, the choice context consists of different consumer
goods, in which case the attributes would stand for quality and price (BSG 2013). In
a litigation example, the choice context consists of the loss and damages from different
decisions available to the judge (see Section 3.1).
A fully rational decision maker values option k according to the linear utility function:
u(a1k, a2k) = θ1a1k + θ2a2k, (3)
where θ1, θ2 > 0, and where weights add up to one, θ1+θ2 = 1. If the decision maker chooses
among risky prospects, θ1 captures the probability of state 1 and θ2 = 1− θ1 the probability
of state 2. If the decision maker chooses among consumer goods characterized by quality and
price, then θ1 is the weight on quality qk while θ2 is the weight on price pk (so that a1k = qk
and a2k = −pk). We assume for simplicity that in this case θ1 = θ2 = 1/2.
A salient thinker departs from Equation (3) by inflating the relative weight attached to
the attribute that he perceives to be more salient. An attribute is salient for option k in
the choice set C if this attribute “stands out” relative to the other attributes of the same
option. Formally, denote by (a1, a2) the reference option consisting of average attributes
ai =
∑N
k aik/N in C. The salience of attribute i = 1, 2 for a generic option k is then given
by σ(aik, ai), where σ(·, ·) is a salience function that satisfies the following properties:
Definition 1 The salience function σ(·, ·) is symmetric, continuous and satisfies:
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1) Ordering. Let µ = sgn(aik − ai).2 Then for any , ′ ≥ 0 with + ′ > 0 we have
σ(aik + µ, ai − µ′) > σ(aik, ai). (4)
2) Diminishing sensitivity. For any aik, ai ≥ 0 and all  > 0 we have:
σ(aik + , ai + ) < σ(aik, ai). (5)
3) Reflection. For any aik, ai, a
′
ik, a
′
i ≥ 0 we have:
σ(aik, ai) > σ(a
′
ik, a
′
i)⇔ σ(−aik,−ai) > σ(−a′ik,−a′i). (6)
For a given option k, its attribute 1 is salient when σ(a1k, a1) > σ(a2k, a2), while its
attribute 2 is salient when σ(a1k, a1) < σ(a2k, a2). Attributes 1 and 2 are equally salient
when σ(a1k, a1) = σ(a2k, a2).
Definition 1 encodes three key features of sensory perception. First, our perceptive appa-
ratus is attuned to detect changes in stimuli. This is captured by ordering, which states that
salience increases in contrast: option k’s value of attribute i, namely aik, is more salient the
farther it is from the reference value ai of that attribute. In the consumer choice example,
if a consumer good is much cheaper than average, then its low price is very salient. In the
risky choice example, if in a given state of the world a risky lottery pays much more than
all the other lotteries do, then that high payoff is salient for the lottery in question.
The second feature is that changes in stimuli are perceived with diminishing sensitivity.3
Formally, an attribute’s salience decreases as the value of that attribute increases uniformly
for all options. For instance, at higher price (or payoff) levels, given price (or payoff) dif-
ferences are less noticeable and thus less salient. The difference between $10 and $20 looms
larger than the difference between $110 and $120.
2When aik = ai, the ordering condition (4) holds for µ = ±1.
3In the context of sensorial perception, this property is known as Webers law, after the 19th century
German physician Ernst Weber who studied experimental psychology. For example, a given change in
luminosity is perceived less intensely if it occurs at a higher luminosity level.
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Third, our perceptive apparatus is sensitive to differences in magnitudes, or absolute
values, so the impact of salience on positive and negative attributes is formally identical.
In the case of consumer goods, quality and price are treated symmetrically. In the case of
lotteries, we attend to unusually large positive and negative payoffs equally.
These features interact to determine the salience of each option’s attributes, but they
can also be in tension. For instance, in the consumer goods case, if price levels and price
dispersion both increase, then diminishing sensitivity suggests that price salience decreases
while ordering suggests the opposite. Following BSG (2013) we resolve this tension by
assuming that the salience function is homogeneous of degree zero:
A.0: The salience function satisfies ordering and homogeneity of degree zero, which is
defined as σ(α · ai, α · ai) = σ(ai, ai) for all α 6= 0 and all ai, ai 6= 0.
Homogeneity of degree zero characterizes salience in an intuitive way: an attribute’s
salience increases with the proportional difference in the value of that attribute relative to
the reference level.4 Together with ordering, homogeneity implies diminishing sensitivity
and reflection of salience.
An example of a salience function satisfying homogeneity of degree zero is:
σ(aik, ai) =
|aik − ai|
|aik|+ |ai| , (7)
for aik, ai 6= 0, and σ(0, 0) = 0.
Consider how salience distorts the valuation of an option in the choice set. Given a
salience function σ, the decision maker – we call him a salient thinker – ranks the salience
of the option’s attributes and distorts their utility weights as follows:
Definition 2 The salient thinker’s valuation of option k enhances the relative weight at-
4In other words, upon a variation in an option’s attribute aik, ordering dominates diminishing sensitivity
if and only if the change in aik is proportionally larger than the induced change in the reference ak.
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tached to the salient attribute (while keeping the sum of utility weights constant). Formally:
usk =

θ1
θ1+δθ2
· a1k + δθ2θ1+δθ2 · a2k if σ(a1k, a1) > σ(a2k, a2)
δθ1
δθ1+θ2
· a1k + θ2δθ1+θ2 · a2k if σ(a1k, a1) < σ(a2k, a2)
θ1 · a1k + θ2 · a2k if σ(a1k, a1) = σ(a2k, a2)
. (8)
where δ ∈ (0, 1] decreases in the severity of salient thinking.
When evaluating an option k, the salient thinker pays more attention to, and over-
weights, its salient attribute. If attribute 1 is salient, its relative utility weight increases
from θ1 to θ1/(θ1 + δθ2) > θ1, while the relative weight of attribute 2 decreases from θ2 to
δθ2/(θ1 + δθ2) < θ2. Conversely, if attribute 2 is salient, its relative utility weight increases
to θ2/(θ2+δθ1) > θ2, while the relative weight of attribute 1 decreases to δθ1/(θ2+δθ1) < θ1.
As δ → 0, the salient thinker considers only the most salient attribute and fully neglects
the non-salient attribute. If δ = 1, the salient thinker pays equal attention to both salient
and non-salient attributes, so his valuation is rational. Normalization of the utility weights
ensures that valuation of the option (a1k, a2k) lies between a1k and a2k.
The salience model provides a novel and unified framework to explain a large set of
anomalies in individual choice, both in a riskless setting (BGS, 2013) and in choice under
risk (BGS 2012). We now consider two examples of the impact of salience on choice, which
will bear on our subsequent analysis of judicial decision making.
2.3 Payoff Salience and the Instability of Risk Attitudes
The salience model provides a unified explanation for the instability of risk preferences
illustrated by Allais paradoxes, framing effects, and preference reversals (BGS 2012). In fact,
equation (8) shows that the decision weights associated to lottery payoffs are determined by
the payoffs’ salience, which in turn is shaped by the comparison to other lotteries in the
choice set and by how payoffs are framed.
To illustrate the model, we now work through Experiments 1 and 2 of section 2.1. Each
Experiment compares a risky lottery to a sure prospect. The risky lottery’s downside occur
8
in state 1, with probability θ1 = .95, and its upside on state 2, with probability θ2 = .05.
In Experiment 1, the two options are L1 = (a11, a21) = (1, 381) and L2 = (a12, a22) =
(20, 20). The reference payoffs are then given by (a1, a2) =
(
20+1
2
, 20+381
2
)
= (10.5, 200.5).
The salience of L1’s downside is σ(a11, a1) = σ(10.5, 1), while the salience of its upside is
σ(a21, a2) = σ(381, 200.5). L1’s most salient payoff is its downside, because it exhibits a
larger percentage difference from the relevant reference payoff, namely 10.5/1 > 381/200.5.5
Given this salience ranking, Equation (8) implies that the lotteries are evaluated as:
uS(L1) =
0.95
0.95 + δ · .05 · 1 +
δ · .05
0.95 + δ · .05 · 381, u
S(L2) = 20. (9)
In evaluating lottery L1, the salient thinker increases the weight attached to its salient
downside of $1 and reduces the weight attached to its upside of $381. As a consequence,
his evaluation of L1 falls below its expected value of 20. The valuation of the sure prospect
L2 is instead unaffected by salience, because it yields the same payoff in all states. As a
consequence, in Experiment 1 the salient thinker is risk averse, choosing L2 over L1.
Consider the behavior of the salient thinker in Experiment 2. The two options are
L1 = (a11, a21) = (301, 681), and L2 = (a12, a22) = (320, 320), and the reference payoffs are
(a1, a2) = (310.5, 500.5). The salient payoff for L1 is its upside, because state 2 features a
higher percentage payoff difference than state 1, namely 681/500.5 > 310.5/301. The two
options are now valued as:
uS(L1) =
δ · .95
δ · .95 + 0.05 · 301 +
0.05
δ · .95 + 0.05 · 681, u
S(L2) = 320.
In evaluating lottery L1 the salient thinker now increases the weight attached to its salient
upside $681 and reduces that of its downside $301, so that uS(L1) > 320. Just as the
experimental subjects, the salient thinker is now risk seeking and prefers L1 to L2.
From this analysis we distill the following psychological intuition for the reversal in risk
attitudes. The choice between the two lotteries requires individuals to trade off – for given
5In greater detail, σ(a11, a1) = σ(1, 10.5) which equals σ(10.5, 1) by symmetry of the salience function.
In turn, σ(381, 200.5) = σ(381/200.5, 1) due to homogeneity. Then ordering ensures that σ(10.5, 1) >
σ(381/200.5, 1), because 10.5 > 381/200.5.
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probabilities – the $19 loss against the $361 gain of the risky lottery. In standard theory,
individuals evaluate this tradeoff in absolute terms, making context independent choices.
Salience theory, in contrast, captures the psychological principle that individuals evaluate
costs and benefits not in a vacuum, but relative to the choice context they face. The $19
loss of the risky lottery looks much smaller (and thus non-salient) when the payoff level is
high at $320 than when the payoff level is low at $20. In contrast, the $361 gain of the risky
lottery looks quite large regardless of the payoff level. The shift in payoff levels changes
the “anchor” to which lottery gains and losses are compared, explaining the shift from risk
aversion in Experiment 1 to risk seeking in Experiment 2.
2.4 Wine and Decoys
Consider again the riskless choice between a French syrah and an Australian shiraz. At
the store, the French syrah has attributes (30,−20) and the Australian shiraz has attributes
(20,−10), where attribute 1 captures quality while attribute 2 captures price (both measured
in dollars). In the store the reference wine is (a1, a2) = (25,−15). In this case, price
is salient for both the French syrah (i.e., 30/25 < 20/15) and the Australian shiraz (i.e.,
25/20 < 15/10). The salient thinker focuses on price and chooses the cheaper Australian
wine. Formally, δ · 30− 20 < δ · 20− 10.
At the restaurant, the French syrah has attributes (30,−60), while the Australian shiraz
has attributes (20,−50). The reference wine at the restaurant is then (a1, a2) = (25,−55).
Quality is now salient for both the French syrah (i.e., 30/25 > 60/55) and the Australian
shiraz (i.e., 25/20 > 55/50). The salient thinker focuses on quality and chooses the more
expensive French wine. Formally, 30− δ · 60 > 20− δ · 50.
The role of comparative evaluation is clear: the extra $10 cost of the French syrah looks
high when perceived in the context of low store prices, but it feels low when perceived in
the context of high restaurant prices. As a consequence, the consumer is willing to pay $10
more to get higher quality at the restaurant, but not at the store.
Comparative evaluation can also induce the so called decoy effect, which has been well
documented in psychology and marketing (Huber, Payne and Puto 1983, Tversky and Simon-
son 1993): given a pairwise choice, adding an alternative dominated by one of the available
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options boosts the demand for the dominating option. This is at odds with standard theory,
according to which the inclusion of irrelevant (in this case dominated) alternatives should
not affect choice.
To see how this works, suppose that at the store a third, expensive wine d ≡ (30,−30)
is added to the choice set. This wine has the same quality of the French syrah but a
higher price. The inclusion of this option would not affect the preferences of a rational
decision maker. Not so for a salient thinker. In the new choice set, the reference wine is
(a1, a2) =
(
30+30+20
3
,−30+20+10
3
)
=
(
80
3
,−20). Against this new reference good, the French
syrah is now quality salient (i.e., 30/(80/3) > 20/20), while the Australian shiraz continues
to be price salient (i.e., 20/(80/3) < 20/10). As a consequence, when the expensive decoy
wine d is added, the salient thinker switches to choosing the expensive French wine. Formally,
30− δ · 20 > δ · 20− 10.
Once again, this instability of preferences is due to comparative evaluation. Without the
decoy, the French wine is evaluated in comparison to the cheaper Australian wine. In this
context, the consumer focuses on the fact that the French wine is more expensive, so that
it is perceived as a worse deal than the alternative. When the expensive decoy wine d is
added to the choice set, the consumer compares the French wine to the decoy as well. In
this context, the French wine is perceived as a better deal, so that the consumer focuses on
its high quality and chooses it.
3 Salience Theory and Judicial Decision Making
Judicial decision making is a promising field for applying Salience Theory. Most judicial
decisions involve the resolution of complex tradeoffs. Judicial evaluation of specific situations
does not occur in a vacuum, and may be shaped by the litigants’ positions and the judge’s own
experience, over and above the informational content of these inputs. A recent experimental
literature has documented a variety of such contextual effects on legal decisions by jury-
eligible persons as well as by judges (e.g. Rachlinski 1996, Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich
2001, Viscusi 1999, 2001, Kelman, Rottenstreich and Tversky 1996). In this section, we show
that the salience model provides a unified account of these disparate pieces of experimental
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evidence. This suggests that the logic of comparative evaluation captured by Salience Theory
may play an important role on judicial evaluation more generally.
A skeptic might object that experimental evidence sheds little light on actual courtroom
decision making. Experiments are necessarily simple, and fail to capture the complexity of
actual cases. Judges in real world cases care more about getting the right answer than they
do when answering experimental questions. They have the time and resources to get the
information they need. Perhaps most important, judges are trained to cut through the forest
of information, and to focus on the legally relevant facts that they can apply the law to.
We do not find these objections compelling. If anything, the complexity of actual court-
room experience would make judges more rather than less vulnerable to psychological biases
than they are in streamlined experiments. In the courtroom, judges are bombarded with
material that draws their attention away from legally relevant facts, including human aspects
of the case, attorneys’ rhetoric, and introduction of precedents pulling in different directions.
Judges are extremely busy, and must devote enormous effort to keep straight all the facts
and legal nuance under consideration. Rather than cut through the forest of irrelevant dis-
agreements, judges may look for a clearing in the forest that lets the light shine through.
Yet such a clearing is likely to be delivered precisely by the salient facts of the case, which
stand out and draw judicial attention, even when the salience of these facts is driven by
legally irrelevant information. The salient facts or precedents enable judges to form quick
intuitive assessments as to “who is right,” and to proceed to process further evidence through
this lens. In balancing conflicting evidence, salience of particular facts can thus distort the
judicial decision making process, and more so when the situation is more complex. In our
view, then, the evidence from the relatively clean and straightforward experiments puts a
lower bound on the influence of psychological factors on judicial decisions.
3.1 Irrelevant Information and the Setting of Damages
Judicial setting of monetary damages often involves a subjective comparison of the loss
incurred by the plaintiff and the cost imposed on the defendant. By the comparative eval-
uation principle, these subjective quantifications can be influenced by bringing to a judge’s
mind specific instances of compensation. The following experiments provide two concrete
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examples of this phenomenon.
Experiment 1. Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich (2001) describe an experiment con-
ducted with a subject pool of 167 federal magistrate judges, who were presented with the
following case: “Suppose that you are presiding over a personal injury lawsuit that is in fed-
eral court based on diversity jurisdiction. The defendant is a major company in the package
delivery business. The plaintiff was badly injured after being struck by one of the defen-
dant’s trucks when its brakes failed at a traffic light. Subsequent investigations revealed
that the braking system on the truck was faulty, and that the truck had not been properly
maintained by the defendant. The plaintiff was hospitalized for several months, and has
been in a wheelchair ever since, unable to use his legs. He had been earning a good living
as a free lance electrician and had built up a steady base of loyal customers. The plaintiff
has requested damages for lost wages, hospitalization and pain and suffering, but has not
specified an amount. Both parties have waived their rights to a jury trial”. Judges were
randomly assigned to either a “No Anchor” or an “Anchor” condition. Judges in the No
Anchor group were asked: “how much would you award the plaintiff in compensatory dam-
ages?” Judges in the Anchor condition were also informed that “[t]he defendant has moved
for dismissal of the case, arguing that it does not meet the jurisdictional minimum for a
diversity case of $75, 000”. These judges had to rule on the motion, and then they were
asked “[i]f you deny the motion, how much would you award the plaintiff in compensatory
damages?” The additional information here constitutes a (normatively irrelevant) anchor
on the grounds that the plaintiff had clearly incurred damages greater than $75, 000. As a
consequence, absent anchoring effects, judges should deny the motion to dismiss and there
should be no difference in the damages awarded by judges belonging to the No Anchor and
to the Anchor treatment.
Consistent with the motion being meritless, only two (2.3%) of the judges in the Anchor
group granted the motion to dismiss the case. At the same time, the 66 judges in the No
Anchor condition indicated that they would award plaintiff an average of $1.25 million while
the 50 judges in the Anchor condition awarded an average of $882, 000. Asking the judges
to rule on a frivolous motion depressed mean damage awards by more than $350, 000 (or
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29.4%) in this hypothetical case, pointing to a very strong anchoring effect.
Experiment 2. Viscusi (2001) describes an experiment conducted with a subject pool of
jury-eligible subjects, who were presented with the following case: “A major auto company
with annual profits of $7 billion made a line of cars with a defective electrical system. This
failure led to a series of fires in these vehicles that caused 4 burn deaths per year. Changing
the design to prevent these deaths would cost $16 million for the 40, 000 vehicles affected
per year. This safety design change would raise the price of cars $400 each. The company
thought there might be some risk from the current design, but did not believe it would be
significant. The company notes that even with these injuries, the vehicle had one of the best
safety records in its class. The courts have awarded each of the victims’ families $800, 000
in damages to compensate them for the income loss and pain and suffering that resulted.
After these lawsuits, the company altered future designs to eliminate the problem.”
Subjects were randomly assigned to two groups, which we call “Precautions Considered”
and “Precautions Not Considered.” In both groups, subjects were asked to indicate whether
the court should award punitive damages and, if so, how much. However, in the Precau-
tions Considered group, subjects were further told that the auto company had performed
a corporate risk analysis and decided against taking precautions and changing the design.
Note that precautions are inefficient from an economic perspective: the $16 million cost to
the company to fix the faulty system greatly exceeds the expected loss (expected number of
fires times compensation per fire), valued at roughly $3.2 million. Viscusi (2001) highlights
that, on these grounds, the additional information is irrelevant from the perspective of an
efficient precautions analysis.
In contrast to the efficient precautions analysis, a large majority of subjects in either
group would award punitive damages in this case. Centrally to our argument, however,
subjects in the Precautions Considered group were more likely to award punitive damages
(96% vs 88%), and, conditional on this, awarded much higher damages: the median award
more than tripled, from $1 million in the No Precautions Considered group to $3.5 million
in the Precautions Considered group.
The authors of the two studies interpret their results in light of distinct and specific
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mechanisms of decision making. To explain the effect of bringing the motion to dismiss to
the judges’ attention, Guthrie et al. (2001) suggest that being exposed to the motion may
have caused the judges to consider the possibility that the true damages in this case were
exceptionally low, so that their resolution of the uncertainty associated with the loss results
in comparatively low damage estimates. To explain the effect of reminding judges about
the failed possibility of taking precautions, Viscusi (2001) attributes the exceptionally high
punitive damages to the subjects’ “outrage” at the company’s actions, and to their wish to
“send a signal” to the company that “human life is more important than profits.”6
While these case-specific mechanisms have merit, we argue that both examples are also
fully consistent with the common mechanism of comparative evaluation. Before the formal
analysis, we briefly describe its logic. After reading the damage case, the judge (or juror)
comes up with an assessment of the plaintiff’s loss. If this loss is salient in the context of the
case, the judge sets high damages (potentially above the assessment) to reflect its perceived
severity. If in contrast the loss is not salient, the judge sets lower damages (potentially below
the assessment) to avoid an unfairly high penalty on the defendant. Consider the Guthrie
et al. (2001) experiment: when the motion to dismiss suggests that the plaintiff’s severe
injuries could be compensated with $75, 000 or less, any reasonable damage figure (which is
necessarily much higher than $75, 000) is salient, and more likely to stand out relative to the
assessed loss. As a consequence, judges select lower damages in the Anchor group compared
to the No Anchor group. In the Viscusi (2001) experiment, when the jurors are reminded
that no loss would have occurred had precautions been taken, a course of action the company
contemplated and ultimately rejected, any estimated loss becomes more salient relative to
the low cost to the company of avoiding it (regardless of efficiency considerations). As a
consequence, jurors award higher damages in the Precautions Considered group than in the
No Precautions Considered group.7
6To get at what drives his results, Viscusi (2001) varies the level of risk and the cost per life saved in his
hypothetical cases. These variables are not significantly associated with the damages awarded, leading to
the conclusion that “all that matters is whether the company performed a risk analysis in advance.”
7Though Viscusi’s experiment pertains to punitive damages, we argue for interpreting the damages awards
as compensation for the victims’ loss. Supporting this interpretation, when jurors were given different esti-
mates of the value of life they adjusted the level of damages proportionately (which would not be warranted
under a deterrent view of punitive damages). Similarly, the assessed damages are broadly insensitive to the
probability of injury or the cost of precautions.
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Salience Theory offers a formal account of the judge’s decision making process. In setting
damages, he evaluates a trade-off between two dimensions: an assessment of the plaintiff’s
loss L (dimension 1) and the cost C to the defendant (dimension 2) of precautions or damage
payments in court. A loss-cost package is then captured by the vector (−L,C).
A judge wants to set compensation so as to make the plaintiff whole, namely so that the
plaintiff is indifferent between having his loss compensated and having suffered no loss at
all. Formally, the judge calculates the plaintiff’s willingness to accept WTA(L) to bear the
loss L, which denotes the minimum amount of money C the plaintiff is willing to accept in
order to choose (−L,C) over the status quo (0, 0) in which no injuries are sustained and
correspondingly no damages are received from the defendant. A rational judge sets:
WTA(L) = min{C s.t. u(C − L) ≥ u(0)}
where u(·) is given by (3). Assume that the utility of the plaintiff is proportional to C − L,
assigning equal weights (θ1 = θ2 = 1/2) to damages and loss, both expressed in dollars.
Then, the rational judge sets WTA(L)= L, irrespective of the provision of meritless motions
or of information about precautions.
In contrast, the salient thinker includes other information – such as the possibility to
dismiss the first case or the expectation that precautions are taken in the second case – in
the case’s context. Specifically, this context C includes the plaintiff’s hypothetical choice
options that are required to evaluate his compensation, namely the actual loss-cost package
(−L,C) and the status quo (0, 0), but it also includes any specific loss-cost package (−L˜, C˜)
that is brought to the judge’s attention. In this formalism, the motion to dismiss corresponds
to the loss-cost package L˜ = L, C˜ = 75, 000, while the auto company precaution corresponds
to the package L˜ = 0, C˜ = 16 million. The willingness to accept computed by the salient
thinking judge in context C is then given by:
WTAS(L|C) = min{C s.t. uS(C − L|C) ≥ uS(0, 0|C)}
where uS(·) is now given by (8). The judge still calculates the minimum damages C to be
paid by the defendant such that the plaintiff chooses (−L,C) over (0, 0), but the superscript
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S now indicates that the judge’s tradeoff between losses to the plaintiff and costs to the
defendant is shaped by salience. In line with Equation (8), when the loss is salient the
judge overweighs it in the plaintiff’s utility function, and sets a higher WTA. When instead
damages are salient, the judge overweighs the benefit of receiving damages in the plaintiff’s
utility function, and sets a lower WTA.
Critically, whether the plaintiff’s loss L or a given cost C is salient depends on which
specific loss-cost package (−L˜, C˜) the judge is reminded of.
Consider first the baseline No Anchor / No Precautions Considered conditions, in which
no information on the motion to dismiss or on precautions considered by the company is
provided. In this case, the choice context is simply C = {(−L,C), (0, 0)}. The reference loss
in this context is L/2 and the reference damage cost is C/2. In this case, for any chosen
level of damages C, losses and damages are equally salient because:
σ(L,L/2) = σ(1, 1/2) = σ(C,C/2),
which holds by homogeneity of degree zero. This implies that (all proofs in the Appendix):
Lemma 1 In the baseline experiments (No Anchor / No Precautions Considered), salient
thinking judges set the rational damages C = L.
As implied by Equation (8), when damages and losses are equally salient, judicial valua-
tion is not distorted and satisfies the strict liability principle.
Consider now the case where the choice context is C = {(−L,C), (0, 0), (−L˜, C˜)}, where
(−L˜, C˜) is a generic a loss-cost package the judge is reminded of. This could be one of
the experimental treatments above (motion to dismiss or information about precautions)
or more generally it could be a precedent-setting damage award in a related case. In this
context, the reference loss is (L+ L˜)/3, while the reference damage is (C + C˜)/3. Thus, the
plaintiff’s loss L is more salient than a chosen level C of damages imposed on the defendant
if and only if:
σ
(
L,
L+ L˜
3
)
> σ
(
C,
C + C˜
3
)
.
In the remainder of the analysis, we focus on the case where L˜ < 2L and C˜ < 2C (which both
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hold in the examples in question). In this case, it is immediate to show that the plaintiff’s
loss is salient if and only if:
C
L
<
C˜
L˜
, (10)
namely, whenever the ratio of the company’s cost in terms of damages C relative to the
plaintiff’s assessed loss L is lower than the corresponding ratio in the “anchor” scenario
(−L˜, C˜). Instead, the company’s cost is salient when the damages C are high (relative to
the loss) as compared to the anchor scenario (−L˜, C˜).
This mechanism has far reaching implications. When reminded of a stingy compensation
package (small C˜/L˜) per unit of loss, the judge views even very small damages as salient,
which reduces the judge’s assessed WTA. When reminded of the possibility of avoiding the
plaintiff’s losses altogether (large C˜/L˜), the loss incurred by the plaintiff is salient, which
boosts the judge’s WTA. More generally, judges set damages as follows:
Proposition 1 When the anchor (−L˜, C˜) is provided, the salient thinker sets damages:
WTAs =

δ · L if C˜/L˜ < δ
C˜/L˜ if δ < C˜/L˜ < 1/δ
1/δ · L if C˜/L˜ > 1/δ
. (11)
Roughly speaking, the salient thinking judge targets the share of the compensated loss
C/L to the ratio C˜/L˜ prevailing in the comparative situation. In this sense, C˜/L˜ truly
provides an anchor for setting compensation. When C/L is above the anchor C˜/L˜, the cost
imposed on the defendant is the salient attribute of the case, which tends to induce the judge
to reduce C. When C/L is below the anchor C˜/L˜, the plaintiff’s loss is the salient attribute
of the case, which tends to induce the judge to increase C. This mechanism implies that
if in the comparative situation the company bears a small cost C˜/L˜ < 1, the presence of
the anchor reduces damages below the initial assessment of the loss L. When instead in the
comparative situation the plaintiff bears a small loss C˜/L˜ > 1, the anchor boosts damages
above the initial assessment of the actual loss L. Because the costs imposed on the company
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tend to be set in the same proportion to the loss as that in the anchor, Proposition 1 might
be called a model of comparative proportionality of damages.
At this point we can revisit the two experiments. Guthrie et al. (2001)’s motion to
dismiss provides an anchor where L˜ = L and C˜ = $75, 000. The ratio C˜/L˜ is equal to C˜/L,
making any compensation C above C˜ = $75, 000 salient. According to (11) this depresses
the awarded level of damages, consistent with the experimental findings. The consideration
of precautions in Viscusi’s (2001) experiment provides an anchor where L˜ = 0 and C˜ = $16
million. Here the ratio C˜/L˜ is extremely high, making losses salient for any positive damage
C. This implies, by Equation (11), that the awarded damages are increased, which is also
consistent with the experimental findings.8
The intuition for these results is clear. When adjusting damages around an assessment
of losses, the judge faces the difficult task of trading off the non monetary loss incurred by
the plaintiff and the monetary cost imposed on the defendant. The principle of compara-
tive evaluation implies that the presence of an anchor for costs affects how this tradeoff is
resolved. Making judges think about precedents where sizeable losses receive zero or little
compensation induces them to view even fairly low damages as generous, reducing their own
estimate of a fair compensation. Making judges think about precedents where compensation
was generous, or about counterfactuals which make the losses more salient, induces them to
view fairly high damages as stingy, thus increasing their compensation recommendation.9
8Of course, it is not always possible for judges to exactly match C˜/L˜. In particular, when the anchor
provides very little compensation, (C˜/L˜) < δ – the case of Guthrie et al.’s experiment – damages are salient
but the judge still needs to compensate the non-salient loss δ · L. The fact that the plaintiff’s loss is non-
salient, however, implies that damages are set below the assessment L. Matching the anchor is also not
possible when it assigns a very high cost on the defendant per unit loss of the plaintiff – the case of Viscusi’s
experiment. In this case, matching the ratio C˜/L˜ when losses do occur would require the judge to impose
arbitrarily high damages on the defendant. Instead, the judge limits the damages to be commensurate with
the salient loss of (1/δ) · L. The fact that the plaintiff’s loss is now salient then implies that compensation
is above the initial assessment L.
9In the context of riskless consumer choice, this finding parallels the famous beer experiment proposed by
Thaler (1985, 1999). Subjects are told to imagine sunbathing with a friend on a beach in Mexico. It is hot,
and the friend offers to get an ice-cold Corona from the nearest seller, a hundred yards away, to be brought
back and consumed on the beach. Subjects are asked for their reservation price. In the first treatment,
the nearest place to buy the beer is a beach resort. In the second treatment, the nearest place is a corner
store. Many subjects would pay more for a beer from a resort than for one from the store, contradicting the
fundamental assumption that willingness to pay for a good is independent of context.
As we showed in BGS (2013), the salience model explains the Thaler experiment through a mechanism
similar to the one illustrated here. Because the salient thinker expects a high price for beer at the resort,
he is willing to pay a higher price and still perceive the beer as a good deal (salient quality). In contrast, at
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This discussion illustrates how the anchoring mechanism may be pervasive in legal deci-
sion making. Anchors can most naturally be formed by precedents, in which case salience
provides a force of conformity to precedent preserving the stability of the law. But anchors
can also arise from irrelevant information, as illustrated in Guthrie et al.’s experiment, or
from judges’ expectations about, or counterfactuals to, the facts of the case, as illustrated
in Viscusi’s experiment.
3.2 Legal Decoys
The logic of the previous section has further implications to areas of law where parties must
choose between several courses of action. This is illustrated by the following hypothetical le-
gal counselling case, proposed by Kelman et al. (1996) to undergraduate students at Stanford
University:
“The Economics Department of a major university voted, two years ago, to recommend
that your client, then an Associate Professor at the University, not be promoted to a tenured
position. She claims that she was discriminated against on account of her gender. Your client
is interested in (1) being compensated for wrongs done to her and in (2) having the University
publicly admit wrongdoing in her case. At the same time, your client is very interested in
the progress of women generally and wants (3) to do her part to push for affirmative action
plans that would help women in Economics. The University counsel’s office has contacted
you and asked you to communicate settlement offers to your client.”
Subjects had to advise their client on which settlement offer to accept. One group of
subjects had to choose among two settlement offers (Choice Context 1). The first offer
bound the University to an affirmative action plan for the Economics Department without
admitting wrongdoing or paying damages. The second offer consisted of a public admission
of wrongdoing and $45, 000 in damages. Another group of subjects (Choice Context 2) had
to choose among the two offers above plus a third offer, consisting of a public admission of
wrongdoing, plus a donation of $35, 000 in the client’s name to her favorite charity. Note
that the third offer is clearly inferior to the second offer, because the plaintiff could always
the store, where beer is expected to be cheap, a high price would be very salient and the salient thinker is
unwilling to pay it.
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accept the $45, 000 damages of the second offer, give $35, 000 to charity, and keep $10, 000
for herself.
The behavior of rational subjects should be the same in both choice contexts. This is
because the third settlement offer is dominated by the second (and thus irrelevant). In the
experiment, however, behavior changed markedly from Choice Context 1 to Choice Context
2: while only 50% of subjects chose the second settlement offer in choice Context 1, 76%
of the subjects chose the second settlement offer in Choice Context 2 when the third offer
was included. In line with the decoy effect, the introduction of a dominated settlement offer
increased the valuation of the dominating offer.
The decoy logic of section 2.4 illustrates how salience accounts for this effect: the presence
of the dominated third offer, with its lower monetary compensation, increases the salience
of the dominating option’s higher monetary compensation, and thus boosts the latter’s val-
uation. Formally, suppose that the plaintiff values two broad categories of compensatory
measures: non-monetary and monetary. Non-monetary measures include the University’s
public admission of wrongdoing and/or its pursuit of an affirmative action plan. Denote by
g the defendant’s dollar value of a public admission of wrongdoing, and by G the value of
an affirmative action plan. Monetary measures obviously consist of damages, part of which
may be valued less than free cash if earmarked to a specific use (charity in this case). Sup-
pose that the defendant discounts each dollar earmarked to charity by φ ≤ 1.10 The three
settlement offers are then described by:
S1 = (G, 0), S2 = (g,D2), S3 = (g, φ ·D3),
where attribute 1 captures non-monetary benefits, attribute 2 captures monetary benefits,
and D2 = 45, 000, D3 = 35, 000.
If the plaintiff’s utility function has θ1 = θ2 = 1/2 in Equation (3), she computes the
overall utility of an offer by simply adding monetary and non-monetary attributes. In con-
trast, the salient thinker attaches a higher weight to the offer’s salient dimension, be it its
monetary or non-monetary component. For simplicity, assume that i) the plaintiff values the
10When φ = 1 the plaintiff would individually implement the same, or higher, charity donation of the
settlement offer.
21
University-wide affirmative action more than the admission of wrongdoing, G > g, and ii)
the plaintiff is not willing to pay $45, 000 out of her pocket for an admission of wrongdoing
by the university, g < D2. These assumptions are reasonable and have two implications.
First, S1 is the best offer from the viewpoint of non-monetary compensation and the worst
offer from the viewpoint of monetary compensation. Second, the valuation of S2 is higher if
the damages it entails, rather than non-monetary compensation, are salient.
Consider the behavior of the salient thinkers. In Choice Context 1, which compares offers
S1 and S2, the reference non-monetary compensation is (G + g)/2 while the reference level
of damages is D2/2. The salient attribute for offer S1 is its total lack of damages, because
σ(0, D2/2) > σ(G, (G+ g)/2) by homogeneity of degree zero. The salient attribute for offer
S2 is its higher damages when:
σ(D2, D2/2) = σ(2, 1) > σ(g, (G+ g)/2) = σ((G+ g)/2g, 1), (12)
which is satisfied if and only if G < 3g. If S2’s damages are salient its evaluation increases
(because high damages are the offer’s best attribute, D2 > g) so S2 is more likely to be
chosen over S1.
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Consider now the problem faced by subjects in Choice Context 2, when the decoy offer
S3 = (g, φ·D3), is added to the choice set. Now, when choosing between S1 and S2, the salient
thinker evaluates these offers in light of the reference attribute values ((G + 2g)/3, (D2 +
φD3)/3). The salient attribute for offer S1 continues to be its total lack of damages (because
of homogeneity of degree zero), so its valuation is the same in both contexts. Intuitively,
the fact that S1 is the only option paying zero damages remains the distinguishing feature
of this offer. On the other hand, the salient attribute of S2 is its monetary compensation if
and only if σ
(
D2,
D2+φD3
3
)
> σ
(
g, G+2g
3
)
which is satisfied if and only if G < g · 7D2−2φD3
D2+φD3
.
Comparing this condition to (12) leads to the following result.
Proposition 2 The set of conditions under which offer S2 is chosen is strictly weaker in
Choice Context 2 than in Choice Context 1 if and only if D2/D3 > 5/4 · φ.
11Formally, if G < 3g, monetary compensation is salient for both S1 and S2, so S2 is chosen if and only if
δ ·g+D2 > δ ·G. If instead G > 3g, monetary compensation is salient for S1 and non-monetary compensation
is salient for S2, so S2 is chosen if and only if g + δD2 > δ ·G, which is a stronger condition.
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The introduction of the dominated offer S3 increases the appeal of the dominating offer
S2 provided the damages paid by S2 are sufficiently high relative to those paid by S3. The
intuition is straightforward: when S3 fares much worse than S2 in term of damages, the
relatively high damages of S2 become salient, thereby boosting its valuation. It is easy to see
that the condition in Proposition 2 is met by the experiment’s monetary values D2 = 45, 000,
D3 = 35, 000.
As with the anchoring effect of Section 3.1, the principle underlying the model’s account of
decoy effects in settlement offers is that of comparative evaluation. When solving a complex
problem such as choosing among multi-dimensional offers, individuals do not harness their
own absolute metric for monetary and non-monetary compensation and apply it to the offers
at hand. Rather, they evaluate different policies in context, by comparing their different
features, and by focusing on each offer’s most distinguishing aspect. When an inferior offer
is added, the advantage of the dominating offer becomes salient, increasing its valuation.
3.3 Framing of Risky Prospects
We conclude our analysis by considering the role of salience in shaping risk attitudes in the
legal context.
It is well known that individuals’ risk preferences depend on whether payoffs are framed in
terms of gains or losses, even though such frames are normatively irrelevant (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). Rachlinski (1996) investigates this issue in a domain where risk preferences
are central to judicial process, namely the decision of whether to settle or litigate. A simple
litigation problem was presented to law students, half of whom played the role of counsel to
the plaintiff and half the role of counsel to the defendant. Subjects had to advise their client
on whether to settle or litigate. In particular, “[p]laintiff-subjects had to choose between
a certain $200, 000 settlement offer and a 50% chance of winning $400, 000 at trial (and a
corresponding 50% chance of winning nothing). Defendant-subjects had to choose between
paying a $200, 000 settlement offer and facing a 50% chance of losing $400, 000 at trial with a
corresponding 50% chance of losing nothing.” Rachlinski found that 77% of plaintiff-subjects
advised to settle, but only 31% of defendant-subjects advised to settle. Plaintiff-subjects were
risk averse, defendant-subjects risk seeking.
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This behavior is inconsistent with Expected Utility Theory. Both plaintiff- and defendant-
subjects choose between a safe amount and a mean preserving spread around it. Under
common risk preferences, plaintiffs and defendants should both prefer to settle (if risk averse)
or to litigate (if risk seeking). The conventional explanation for the observed instability of
risk preferences relies on Prospect Theory’s S-shaped value function, which is assumed to be
concave for gains and convex for losses. This induces risk aversion for plaintiffs (who choose
between a sure gain and a risky gain) and risk seeking for defendants (who choose between
a sure loss and risky loss).
Salience Theory can explain this instability of risk attitudes as a consequence of context
dependence: changing the framing from gains to losses changes the lottery outcome perceived
to be salient, thereby changing risk preferences.12 Salience thus allows us to provide a novel
unified psychological explanation for framing, anchoring and decoy effects.
To see how the salience model can generate framing effects, consider the choice faced by
plaintiff-subjects in Rachlinski’s experiment. The risky litigation has two possible outcomes:
the plaintiff loses the litigation in state 1, wins in state 2, and each state occurs with proba-
bility θ1 = θ2 = 0.5. In terms of its payoffs in the two states of the world, the litigation option
is given by R = (0, 400) (to streamline notation, we write the payoffs in units of thousands of
dollars). In turn, the settlement option gives the same payoff in both states, S = (200, 200).
When comparing the two options, the reference payoff in state 1 is a1 =
0+200
2
= 100, and
that in state 2 is a2 =
400+200
2
= 300. The salient outcome for litigation is then the loss state
1 because σ (0, 100) > σ(400, 300), due to the diminishing sensitivity property of salience
(5). Intuitively, when a sure 200 is in hand, the risk of ending up with 0 is more salient
than the possibility of gaining 400. Because the downside is salient, litigation is valued
less than its expected value of 200 (as in Experiment 1 of Section 2.3). As a consequence,
plaintiff-subjects prefer settlement to litigation, exhibiting risk averse behavior.
Consider now the choice faced by defendant-subjects. In this frame, the available options
are a sure loss coming from a settlement S = (−200,−200) and a risky litigation R =
12In other settings, both plaintiff and defendants stand to gain from the litigation process, as for example
in copyright sharing decisions. When all payoffs are positive, a salient thinker may still shift from risk
seeking to risk averse behavior depending on the framing of the gains, as in the example of Section 2.3. As
we explained there, this behavior is incompatible with Prospect Theory.
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(0,−400), where – consistent with the convention above – in state 1 the defendant wins
and the plaintiff loses. As before, θ1 = θ2 = 0.5. From the defendant-subjects’ perspective,
the reference payoffs are a1 =
0−200
2
= −100 and a2 = −400−2002 = −300. The salient
outcome of litigation is now the winning state 1 because σ (0,−100) > σ(−400,−300), due
to diminishing sensitivity and reflection, Equation (6). When compared to a sure loss of
200, the possibility of nullifying that loss is more salient than the risk of losing 400. Because
the litigation’s upside is salient, litigation is valued above its expected value of −200. As
a consequence, defendant-subjects prefer litigation to settlement, exhibiting risk seeking
behavior.
Changing how payoffs are framed, from the gain to the loss domain, alters risk preferences
by changing the nature of the salient outcome. In the gain domain, the downside risk of
getting zero is salient, while in the loss domain the upside risk of getting zero is salient. Given
that the problem faced by defendants simply subtracts $400, 000 from the problem faced by
plaintiffs, the framing effect shown here has the same nature of the context dependent shift
in risk attitudes discussed in Section 2.3.
Even though the experiment just discussed involves legal counseling of plaintiffs or de-
fendants, the same effects are likely to apply to the judiciary, given that judges often play
an active role in supervising settlement talks. Guthrie et al. (2001) design an experiment
with 167 federal magistrate judges, also documenting a shift in pro-litigation attitudes as the
problem is reframed from gains to losses. But the issue is broader, as many judicial decisions
involve choice among risky prospects. For example, Guthrie et al. (2001) document that
judges are more likely to vote for a risky reorganization plan when creditors’ payoffs are
framed as losses rather than as gains.
4 Conclusion
Judicial decisions of necessity must balance various aspects of the case, ranging from the
severity of misconduct and damages to the nature of the penalties. The process of reaching
such balance or proportionality is vulnerable to the influence of salience: the idea that certain
aspects of the case stand out in judges’ attention and as a consequence influence judicial
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decisions. Of course, there are many legal mechanisms that try to limit salience or other
psychological influences, most importantly precedents. The subtle point here, however, is
that via the mechanism of comparative evaluation, these very mechanisms can shape judicial
decision over and above their original intent. Indeed, the experimental evidence suggests
(though does not prove) that salience can induce even experienced judges to extrapolate too
much from past cases or counterfactual scenarios, distorting standard legal reasoning.
We have illustrated out approach using the analysis of experimental evidence, but here we
consider some broader implications of our framework. In many situations, past cases anchor
judicial decisions. This may explain why lawyers spend so much time relating the facts of the
case to their favored precedents. But salience may also render judicial decisions inconsistent
across cases, especially when driven by salient but legally irrelevant facts. Plaintiffs or
defendants might be conspicuously unappealing individuals, prompting the court to find
ways to put them down. The plaintiff might have suffered extreme harm with no evidence
of negligence, encouraging courts to nonetheless find responsibility so harm is not so salient
relative to compensation. Such hard cases draw judicial attention to the features that should
perhaps matter little, but end up mattering more.
A side benefit of salient thinking is that it encourages legal evolution, which usually
takes the form of distinguishing cases from precedents (see e.g. Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007).
Cases that differ from precedents along a salient dimension are likely to be those in which
precedent leads to decisions whose unfairness or disproportionality if current law is applied
stands out. The evolution of exceptions to the Economic Loss Rule, described by Niblett,
Posner, and Shleifer (2010) has some of that character. Of course, salience can also encourage
distinguishing based on legally irrelevant features of the case, and not just efficient legal
evolution. To the extent that they shape the salience of the facts, cases that come to the
judge’s mind take on great significance (Radin 1925).
It should not be surprising the legal procedure has evolved to constrain the influence of
salience and other cognitive biases. The rules of evidence control what is presented to judges
and juries, and an elaborate body of law has developed to exclude information that might be
prejudicial. The legal system seems highly conscious of the influence of salience; we doubt,
however, that this influence is wholly eliminated.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. In the No Anchor condition, the choice set is C = (−L,C), (0, 0). In
this context, the reference loss is L/2 and the reference damage cost is C/2. Homogeneity
of degree zero of the salience function then implies σ(L,L/2) = σ(1, 1/2) = σ(C,C/2),
so that for any chosen level of damages C, losses and damages are equally salient. As
a consequence, uS(C − L|C) = (C − L)/2, while uS((0, 0)|C) = 0. Then WTAS equals
inf{C s.t. C − L ≥ 0} = L. Therefore, the salient thinking judge sets the rational level of
damages C = L.
Proof of Proposition 1. The reference loss level in C = {(0, 0), (−L,C), (−L˜, C˜)} is
L = (L + L˜)/3, while the reference level of damages is C = (C + C˜)/3. Thus, the salience
of losses and damages of option (−L,C) are, respectively
σ
(
1,
1 + L˜/L
3
)
, σ
(
1,
1 + C˜/C
3
)
Recall from the text the assumption L˜ < 2L and C˜ < 2C (which holds in the examples). It
follows that losses are salient when
C˜
L˜
>
C
L
(13)
Note that as C varies in the range
(
C˜ · 1
2
, C˜ · L
L˜
)
, it can take values larger or smaller than
the reference damage C.
Recall the definition of willingness to pay:
WTAS = min{C s.t. uS(C − L|C) ≥ uS(0, 0|C)}
Consider first the case where the awarded damages are salient, so that they fully compensate
for losses when C = δL. This compensation is indeed salient when C˜/L˜ > C/L. Thus,
WTP= δL whenever C˜/L˜ < δ.
Consider now the case where C˜/L˜ > δ. If the damages were set at C < L · C˜/L˜ then the
loss would be salient, so that the damages can be hiked up all the way till L/δ, as long was the
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salience ranking does not change: WTA= min
{
L · 1
δ
, L · C˜/L˜
}
. Therefore, WTP= L · C˜/L˜
for C˜/L˜ < 1/δ and WTP= L/δ for C˜/L˜ > 1/δ (and C˜ < 2C, namely C˜ < 2L/δ).
Proof of Proposition 2. Because the valuation of offer S1 is constant in both contexts,
the inclusion of the decoy offer (g, φ ·D3) relaxes the conditions under which S2 is chosen if
and only if it relaxes the condition that S2’s upside – its monetary compensation, or damages
– is salient. In context 1, S2’s damages are salient if and only if G < 3g. In context 2 (with
the decoy), S2’s damages are salient if and only if G < g · 7D2−2φD3D2+φD3 . Thus, the decoy makes
it more likely for S2 to be chosen if and only if g · 7D2−2φD3D2+φD3 > 3g, namely D2/D3 > 5/4 · φ.
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